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W
hat I propose to do on this panel today is to talk about sta-
bilization policy and policy cooperation from the viewpoint
of an industrial country that has a floating exchange rate
and both an explicit inflation target for monetary policy and a clear
objective for fiscal policy. While my perspective has been particularly
influenced by my time as deputy minister of finance and now as gover-
nor of Canada’s central bank, the broad outlines of my conclusions are
widely shared, not only in those two institutions, but in Canadian aca-
demic and public policy circles as well. Moreover, I believe that our
experience and the lessons that can be drawn from it are applicable to all
open economies with flexible exchange rates.
In the 1990s, the Bank of Canada and the government of Canada
reached a series of joint agreements on inflation-control targets. As well,
the government established a framework that greatly reduces the proba-
bility of running a fiscal deficit and, thus, puts the debt-to-GDP ratio
on a clear downward track.
Initially, the credibility of these policies was not high; so, it was
essential to demonstrate clearly our resolve to achieve greater fiscal pru-
dence and lower inflation until credibility was gained. Thus, it was
sometimes necessary to override the automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy
Governor Dodge's overview panel remarks are on the bank's website at
www.kc.frb.org.
7980 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
in order to establish credibility. And for monetary policy, it meant that
we could not always implement the easing warranted by our inflation
targets. But as the targets were achieved, the public’s trust that the
authorities were going to do what they said they would do increased.
That trust is tremendously important.
Now that the credibility of both monetary and fiscal policies is
firmly established, the stabilizers are able to do their job.
I would like to begin by considering stabilization policy, then say a
few words on policy cooperation.1
I. STABILIZATION POLICY
Monetary policy and stabilization
In aiming to achieve a 2 percent inflation target over an eighteen-
to twenty-four-month horizon, Canadian monetary policy plays an
important role in stabilizing the economy in response to demand and
supply shocks.
When there are shifts in demand, the direction of changes in our
policy interest rate is quite clear. Suppose that the economy is operating
at its production potential and that inflation is at the 2 percent target. A
downward shift in demand would create excess supply in the economy,
putting downward pressure on inflation. To bring inflation back to 2
percent over a period of eighteen to twenty-four months, the Bank of
Canada would lower its target for the overnight interest rate. Through its
effect on market interest rates and the exchange rate, this action would
increase the level of output in the economy, moving it back toward pro-
duction potential. Inflation would, therefore, return to the target shortly
after the excess supply disappeared from the economy. An upward shift
in demand would, of course, generate symmetric responses.
While the theory is clear about the appropriate response to demand
shocks, the magnitude and persistence of shocks—and, hence, the size
and timing of interest rate adjustments—are always difficult to judge.
This is where the art of monetary policymaking comes into play.
It is even more difficult, of course, to gauge the appropriate mone-
tary policy response to supply shocks, which take the form of higher (or
lower) inflation than expected for a given level of demand. The bank’sECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 81
framework for inflation targeting allows temporary supply shocks to be
largely ignored, as long as they do not feed into inflation expectations.
The credibility that has been established means that they typically no
longer do so. Consider price surprises coming from the most volatile
components of the consumer price index—components such as fruits
and vegetables or fuel oil and natural gas. As our operating guide, we
use a measure of core inflation that excludes these components. This
gives us, and economic observers, some confidence that we are looking
at something close to the underlying trend of inflation. Thus, our inter-
est rate response to price shocks that are perceived to be temporary can
be minimal. As a result, there will be little effect on output. In other
words, monetary policy does not turn temporary supply shocks into
something that is destabilizing for aggregate output.
A more difficult situation occurs when persistent increases or
decreases in prices coming from the most volatile components of the
consumer price index threaten to keep the total index away from the
target for a significant period. Credibility helps here too, but the bank
must be particularly cautious that these movements in inflation do not
feed into inflation expectations.
Supply shocks that take the form of a change in the level or growth
rate of potential output are often hard to recognize. Here, however, the
key is for the central bank to return the trend of inflation to the target
if it has moved away. Since the trend of inflation relative to the target is
the best indicator of where demand is relative to potential output, this
will be consistent with moving demand back into line with the new
path of potential output over the medium term.
Fiscal policy and automatic stabilization
In Canada, the main automatic fiscal stabilizers are various types of
tax revenues, as well as employment insurance payouts. Some of these
fiscal stabilizers work almost immediately—for example, personal
income tax deducted by the employer. Others, such as employment
insurance payments, work with a fairly short lag.82 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Comparing and contrasting automatic fiscal and monetary stabilizers
Automatic fiscal stabilizers are very effective in dampening an
output cycle. But they offset only part of the change in output. In con-
trast, monetary policy can fully offset a change in output, but it takes
time to work, with the full impact on output normally felt only after
twelve to eighteen months.
Discretionary stabilization policy
While the automatic or quasi-automatic stabilization provided by
monetary and fiscal policies is very desirable, the question remains as
to whether there is a role for something further—a discretionary sta-
bilization policy.
In the case of monetary policy, the nature of the response is the
more or less automatic one described earlier. As I implied then, judg-
ment is key to the process. That is particularly true in times of great
uncertainty, such as last autumn. But a clear inflation target means that,
in principle, the discretionary choice for monetary policymakers is
limited relative to that of the fiscal authorities.2
The arguments for and against discretionary fiscal policy as an
important element in macroeconomic stabilization in an open economy
tend to revolve primarily around lags and around the effectiveness of
short-run fiscal policy relative to monetary policy.
If the timing were close to perfect, fiscal policy measures that lasted
for two or three quarters could, in principle and under ideal circum-
stances, shorten the time it takes to move output back to its desired
level. Thus, in principle, discretionary fiscal policy is a useful tool. But,
as a practitioner, I can tell you that the great problem here is that tem-
porary measures are both difficult to initiate quickly when the need
arises and extraordinarily difficult to stop once the need is past.
Thus, as a practical matter not a philosophical one, there are some
severe limitations to the use of discretionary fiscal policy as a stabilizer.3, 4
My views about this have been reinforced by the way the business
cycle in Canada has developed over the last eighteen months or so. In
early 2001, we were expecting that the slowdown in both the U.S. and
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announced tax cut was fortuitously coming into effect. It was not until
the middle of last summer that it became evident that the Canadian
economy was undergoing a more pronounced slowdown than we had
expected. Between January and August 2001, we had lowered our policy
interest rate by 175 basis points. Even the most ardent supporters of dis-
cretionary fiscal policy would not have thought about doing anything
major until August. With the horrific events of September 11, economic
forecasters marked down their forecasts for 2001 and 2002 significantly.
We, like other major central banks, accelerated the pace at which we
were cutting interest rates—from September through January 2002, we
lowered our policy interest rate by a further 200 basis points.
Fortunately, the Canadian government added only a small amount
to spending in its budget announcements in late 2001, and that con-
sisted mainly of necessary spending for security and border issues. I say
“fortunately” because, based on the national accounts published at the
end of May 2002, growth in the Canadian economy actually
rebounded in the fourth quarter of 2001 and accelerated to about 6
percent in the first quarter of this year.
Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that there was more
underlying strength in the economy than we expected. Combined with
the large amount of monetary stimulus that was applied, this meant that
the economy could recover rapidly. Therefore, added fiscal stimulus was
not necessary to get the economy going. And the monetary stimulus
provided is proving much easier to turn around. Since mid-April, we
have raised our policy rate by 75 basis points. To be sure, other uncer-
tainties have arisen and will continue to arise in the future. Our best
judgment about these uncertain factors will continue to be taken into
account. But, overall, this episode is clearly showing that monetary
policy actions can be used more flexibly than fiscal policy actions. 
I would stress that discretionary fiscal policy can also get govern-
ments into trouble if it leads them to neglect their long-run fiscal
anchor—particularly since discretionary action is more likely to be asso-
ciated with an easing in policy than a tightening. This neglect would
risk eroding fiscal credibility—the trust that the public has that the
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II. POLICY COOPERATION AND STABILIZATION
Now, let me turn to the issue of policy cooperation and policy
coordination.
Our inflation targets are joint targets. They are not just the bank’s
targets—they are the targets of the government of Canada as well.
Our view is that, essentially, “coordination” came through the joint
agreement on inflation targets. With clear agreement on the medium-
term policy objectives and with a shared understanding of the policy
framework, there is no need for coordination on the setting of interest
rates and fiscal policy instruments.
The economic literature on policy coordination tends to be about
situations where the fiscal and monetary authorities have one or more
of the following: very different views of economic welfare,5 inconsistent
policy objectives, policy that is totally discretionary, or a tendency to get
involved in game-like behavior with one another. None of these applies
in Canada—and none should apply anywhere.
Given our policy framework, when the government changes fiscal
policy, it needs to think of how these changes will affect inflation and,
consequently, interest rates. Similarly, the Bank of Canada needs to con-
sider how changes in fiscal policy will affect demand and inflation and,
thus, its setting of interest rates. Therefore, it is to the mutual benefit of
both parties to cooperate in sharing information and analysis as they
adjust their policy settings.
Cooperation between the bank and the federal Department of
Finance occurs on a number of levels. I have frequent discussions with
the minister and deputy minister. And there are meetings at the staff
level to share, for example, information from economic forecasts,
surveys, and contacts with various groups and organizations. One of the
key reasons for our regular discussions has been to ensure that each
institution understands the details of the framework within which the
other one is pursuing its objectives and how this framework is being
implemented with respect to current economic surprises. The bank also
keeps in close touch with provincial fiscal authorities.
Thus far, I have not said anything about the appropriate mix of
monetary and fiscal policies when talking about coordination and coop-
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and fiscal policies, the whole issue of policy mix becomes moot. The
fiscal and monetary authorities are both adjusting their policy instru-
ments to attain their respective objectives. There is no other mix of
interest rates and fiscal thrust that the authorities will perceive as consis-
tent with meeting the monetary and fiscal objectives.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Clear monetary and fiscal objectives, combined with clear
accountability for meeting those objectives, provide the background
for policy cooperation and stabilization in Canada. The monetary and
fiscal policy frameworks have created an environment where coopera-
tion in the form of sharing information and analysis is most effective.
Fiscal and monetary credibility is high. In other words, economic
agents trust that the monetary authorities and the fiscal authorities will
maintain these frameworks.
With trust in place and with expectations well-anchored, the auto-
matic fiscal stabilizers can be allowed to operate fully, and monetary
policy actions can be directed to achieving the inflation targets. In addi-
tion, when major shocks occur, with trust in place, there can be a
temporary overshoot or undershoot of the fiscal or monetary targets
without unhinging confidence in the framework or in expectations that
the targets will be met over time.
I believe that Canada’s experience and the lessons we have learned
about having clear policy objectives and supportive, transparent
policy frameworks have broad applicability in open economies with a
flexible exchange rate.86 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1 The interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is covered more fully in
Dodge (2002).
2 Some commentators have described inflation targeting as “constrained dis-
cretion,” in the sense that there is a clear objective and a medium-term frame-
work but no precise rule for varying the policy interest rate (Bernanke and others,
1999). That is, there are many possible paths back to equilibrium. At the Bank of
Canada, we have decided that the best way to implement inflation targeting is to
have an acceptable tradeoff between the variance of inflation around its target and
the variance of output around its production potential. Thus, we have chosen an
eighteen- to twenty-four-month horizon for achieving the inflation target. We
take into account all the relevant information, but we have no simple rule for set-
ting interest rates.
3 This is also the view of Cecchetti (2002) and Taylor (2000). For an oppos-
ing view, see Seidman (2001). Much earlier, Boulding (1969) summarized an aca-
demic session on recent experiences in the use of fiscal policy with a poem
including the following lines, “… Policy may follow Fillip’s Law—Too little and
too late, too much too soon. ...”
4 For the Canadian federal government, the limitation of discretionary fiscal
policy as a stabilizer is compounded by the fact that Canadian provincial govern-
ments taken together represent a larger share of the economy than the federal
government does, and their spending structure (which includes more spending
on capital than the federal government) better lends itself to discretionary spend-
ing for stabilization purposes.
5 That is, their “loss functions” are very different.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 87
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